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The Indian gaming industry is one of the most important sources of governmental revenues
for Indian tribes, but it will remain a healthy revenue source only as long as it is well
regulated by tribal and federal officials..
Casino gaming is unlike any other lawful industry in that large amounts of cash are spent
and returned each day in millions of transactions by thousands of people all across the
country. In an age in which transactions in most other areas of commerce are dominated by
less fungible and more secure financial instruments, such as credit cards, debit cards and
checks, casinos still predominantly operate with cash. The cash intensive nature of the
gaming industry makes it particularly attractive – and particularly vulnerable – to crime and
corruption.
Crime and corruption has, for the most part, been carefully kept in check in Indian gaming
through vigilant adherence by gaming regulators to two primary regulatory strategies: careful
background investigations of the key actors in Indian gaming, and strong internal control
procedures for casino operations. It is widely agreed within the industry that background
investigations and internal controls are crucial to effective regulation and no reasonable
commentator could seriously deny their importance and effectiveness in protecting the
industry. Thus, the key question is not whether these regulatory strategies are valuable and
important, but which governments (tribal, federal, or state) should bear the ultimate
responsibility for implementing these regulatory strategies.
The regulation of gaming has been plagued by a lack of clarity in the roles of the respective
regulatory entities. Now is an appropriate time for Congress to clarify those roles to provide
better guidance to the industry and to regulators.
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I.

IN GENERAL, STATE GOVERNMENTS SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO
REGULATE INDIAN GAMING.

When IGRA was enacted in 1988, most observers likely anticipated that states would use the
compacting process to obtain a strong regulatory presence over Class III gaming. Indeed,
some state governments have strong, reliable and effective Indian gaming regulatory bodies
that provide vital assistance in insuring the integrity of Indian gaming. However, states have
not consistently undertaken regulatory efforts. Congress should not count on states to
handle these important tasks, for three main reasons. First, while tribal and federal
regulators view Indian gaming as an important tribal asset that they have a special obligation
to protect, state regulators may not feel any particular responsibility to insure its long-term
vitality. Instead, they may view Indian gaming activity as simply another economic activity
that must be regulated, reflecting less of a commitment to the integrity of the industry.
Second, through tribal gaming revenue sharing with state governments, states may have an
interest in maximizing gaming revenues, an interest that often overshadows any interest in
strong gaming regulation. This sets up a potential conflict of interest. Meeting regulatory
requirements does, after all, affect the bottom line and can reduce gaming profits. Finally,
the lack of a clear focus and strong state interest in the integrity of Indian gaming leaves the
industry vulnerable. The quality of regulation of Indian casinos ought not exist at the mercy
of state budgetary cycles.
Through the compact process in IGRA, states had the opportunity to become heavily
involved in Indian gaming regulation. While most states have shown a strong interest in
tribal gaming revenues, few have shown significant interest in the actual regulation of
gaming. By and large, states have been “no-shows” in the important area of regulation.
Congress should respect their decision to “opt out” of Indian gaming regulation.
II

A TRIBAL/FEDERAL REGULATORY MODEL IS LIKELY TO BE MOST
RELIABLE.

In my judgment, the primary responsibility for insuring that Indian casinos adopt and
adhere to adequate internal controls ought to lie with tribal gaming regulators who
already exercise a variety of regulatory functions within Indian gaming operations.
In the past ten years, a large and sophisticated community of professional tribal gaming
regulators has taken root across the country. Tribal gaming regulators have proven
themselves, in the main, as effective regulators. In most circumstances, tribal regulators work
conscientiously, competently and independently in providing strong regulation of Indian
casinos. Recognizing their primacy in undertaking these sovereign responsibilities is likely to
produce the most effective regulation. However, tribal regulatory structures have some
obvious regulatory weaknesses and vulnerabilities that justify a strong oversight role
for federal regulators, including the ability to take independent enforcement action
where a tribal gaming commission fails to meet its sovereign responsibilities.
While, in most areas of policy, the important moral and legal principle of tribal sovereignty
ought to protect the right of a tribal government to make regulatory decisions without
federal oversight, Indian gaming is an exception to this principle. I justify exceptionalism on
-2-
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this basis: one of the practical ramifications of tribal sovereignty is that no tribe can be held
accountable to any other tribe. Yet, despite their legal insulation from one another and their
lack of mutual accountability, Indian tribes most certainly can take individual actions that
harm other tribes. In the highly politicized world of Indian gaming, no tribe is an island
unto itself. Indeed, the political fallout from incompetent or corrupt actions of one tribe
may well impact hundreds of other tribes across the country. Indian gaming exists at the
sufferance of Congress and state legislatures and the public whom those bodies represent.
If one Indian casino succumbs to corruption, then the entire Indian gaming industry may
well be tainted. The integrity of the industry – and even the perception of integrity – must be
guarded with vigilance.
In Indian gaming, tribes are linked inextricably to one another. Yet tribal sovereignty means
that each tribe is independent of one another and insulated from any legal responsibility to
other tribes for its actions. Because no tribe has the ability to regulate other sovereign tribes,
this problem is one that tribes cannot solve themselves. In my view, this lack of
accountability of one tribe to another justifies federal oversight to accomplish what tribes
cannot achieve through collective action. In other words, the federal government’s own
sovereign authority in this area can offer sound regulatory coverage that tribes could never
achieve on their own.
Because of the tremendous value of gaming to Indian tribes, Congress and Indian tribes
share a responsibility to ensure the continued health of the Indian gaming industry. While
ninety-nine percent of tribes may regulate responsibly ninety-nine percent of the time, the
occasional lapse affects not only the tribe that behaves irresponsibly, but also taints the
regulatory efforts of the hundreds of tribes that exercise consistent and rigorous gaming
regulation. In this case, the stakes are sufficiently high to justify strong federal regulatory
involvement.
The risk of occasional irresponsible behavior is quite real, for a couple of reasons.1 First,
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act does not currently require that Indian tribes have
independent tribal gaming commissions. Many tribes have created gaming commissions, but
the relative independence of these commissions varies. Tribal commissioners are sometimes
directly accountable to tribal leaders and/or tribal voters. While, in most circumstances, the
tribal interest in the long term health of the gaming operation will give each tribal regulator a
strong incentive to regulate responsibly, there may occasionally be overwhelming temptation
to cut regulatory corners for short term gains.
In the licensure context, for example, I am aware of one tribal gaming commission that
denied a gaming license to persons with ties to organized crime and then reversed itself and
granted the license apparently after feeling pressure from tribal leaders. While such
circumstances are troubling, the dynamics that cause such action are entirely understandable.
Where a lucrative opportunity is available to the tribe, the pressure on the tribal gaming
commission to find a way to facilitate that opportunity may simply be overwhelming, even
I addressed these issues in greater detail in my testimony before this Committee on April 27, 2005. A link to
this testimony can be found at http://www.law.umn.edu/facultyprofiles/washburnk.htm.
1
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though it poses serious risks. In some circumstances, there may be a clear conflict of
interest for tribal regulators. For those tribes that make per capita payments of gaming
revenues to individual members, tribal regulators may have a direct financial interest in seeing
a gaming development happen. Such pressures, which are not unique to tribal governments,
can undermine the quality of regulation at the tribal level.
Because of these pressures and the natural conflicts of interest of tribal regulators, federal
regulators have a comparative advantage. Federal regulators are largely disinterested and
objective; they have no significant conflicts of interest because they achieve no direct or
significant benefit from the development of any particular Indian gaming facility. Thus,
having federal regulators serve an oversight role can help protect Indian gaming from the
occasional lapses that might occur when tribal regulators succumb to pressures to cut
corners. Federal regulations can also serve another valuable function.
Unlike individual tribal or state rules, uniform federal standards can assure the
integrity of gaming on a national scope and indirectly increase the quality and
independence of tribal regulators. In the context of internal controls, for example, the
adoption of uniform federal standards creates a baseline for quality of regulation
nationwide. Creation of such standards not only helps the consumer, it facilitates the
independence of tribal gaming commissioners by insuring that knowledge and expertise is
portable from one reservation to another. Nationwide standards assure a national network
of training and job opportunities that collectively serve to improve the professionalism of
tribal gaming regulators. If a tribal regulator is fired from one reservation for applying the
rules too rigorously, for example, he may well be able to find work with a gaming
commission at another reservation.
Admittedly, federal regulators cannot be as responsive to the unique needs and
circumstances of each individual tribe. Moreover, technology and other relevant
circumstances will change much more quickly than regulators can update a complex and
comprehensive regulatory regime, such as the federal minimum internal controls standards.
To address these disadvantages, tribal gaming commissions and federal regulators should be
open-minded and sensible about allowing reasonable variances to the federal standards.
Federal regulators should adopt standards that allow adequate flexibility at the tribal
level.
III.

CLARIFYING FEDERAL REGULATORY AUTHORITY AND IMPROVING
FEDERAL REGULATION.

While all businesses chafe at regulation, Indian tribes are different than other regulated
entities. This difference is the source of some key problems in Indian gaming and counsels
in favor of a unique approach. First, as sovereign nations, Indian tribes are entitled to a
greater level of clarity than ordinary businesses when Congress mandates legal requirements.
And the NIGC needs a clear Congressional mandate to establish its legitimacy. Because it is
in the best interest of Indian gaming for an independent and objective regulator to oversee
all significant gaming activity, Congress should strengthen the NIGC’s mandate over Class
III gaming. Congress should recognize that NIGC’s authority to assure the integrity
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of Indian gaming extends to Class III gaming activity for all purposes, including
background investigations of management contractors, minimum internal control
standards, and health and safety regulations.
Second, federal Indian gaming regulators must be cognizant of the fact that it is sovereign
governments they are regulating. In my experience, many disputes between Indian tribes and
the NIGC have arisen when federal regulators have behaved in a heavy-handed fashion.
While such heavy-handedness is the norm within the commercial gaming industry in Nevada
and New Jersey and other jurisdictions, the circumstances are far different in Indian gaming.
Regulators in Nevada and New Jersey are regulating private actors, not sovereign nations.
Federal regulators must behave much more carefully and much more respectfully toward the
regulated industry. To be effective, NIGC regulators must not merely be regulators,
but also educators and diplomats. While federal regulators must utilize a variety of skills
to achieve tribal compliance, over-reliance on aggressive regulatory tactics sometimes simply
masks ineffectiveness. Federal regulators should treat tribal regulators and tribal officials
with the same respect and deference that they would show to state officials.
CONCLUSION
While each tribe has a moral right to the exclusive regulation of its own affairs, this moral
right clashes with political reality in the field of Indian gaming where the actions of one
tribe can harm many other tribes.
To protect the value of Indian gaming as a resource for all tribes, Congress should recognize
a clear and strong role for federal regulators. For most tribes, which engage in responsible
regulation of Indian gaming, the NIGC role will be nearly invisible. While a strong role for
the NIGC clearly treads on tribal sovereignty, it is a pragmatic and necessary step to insure
the long-term viability of gaming as a resource for all tribes.
Thank you for asking for my views on this important subject.2
Kevin K. Washburn
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I offer the views set forth above solely as an individual academic and do not purport to speak for the
University of Minnesota, the State of Minnesota, or any other entity or person.
2

-5-

